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MIMO Wiretap Channel
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Abstract—The classic MIMO wiretap channel comprises a
passive eavesdropper that attempts to intercept communications
between an authorized transmitter-receiver pair, each node being
equipped with multiple antennas. In a dynamic network, it
is imperative that the presence of an eavesdropper be de-
termined before the transmitter can deploy robust secrecy-
encoding schemes as a countermeasure. This is a difficult task
in general, since by definition the eavesdropper is passive and
never transmits. In this work we adopt a method that allows
the legitimate nodes to detect the passive eavesdropper from the
local oscillator power that is inadvertently leaked from its RF
front end. We examine the performance of non-coherent energy
detection and optimal coherent detection, followed by composite
GLRT detection methods that account for unknown parameters.
Numerical experiments demonstrate that the proposed detectors
allow the legitimate nodes to increase the secrecy rate of the
MIMO wiretap channel.
Index Terms—MIMO wiretap channel, passive eavesdropper,
energy detection, GLRT.
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast characteristic of the wireless propagation
medium makes it difficult to shield transmitted signals from
unintended recipients. This is especially true in multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) systems with multi-antenna nodes,
where the increase in communication rate to the legitimate
receiver is offset by the enhanced interception capability
of eavesdroppers. A three-terminal network consisting of a
legitimate transmitter-receiver pair and a passive eavesdrop-
per where each node is equipped with multiple antennas is
commonly referred to as the MIMO wiretap or MIMOME
channel. The extent of information leakage in such systems
is captured by the notion of secrecy capacity at the physical
layer, which quantifies the maximal rate at which a transmitter
can reliably send a secret message to the receiver, with the
eavesdropper being completely unable to decode it. Maxi-
mizing the achievable secrecy rate at the physical layer can
therefore complement encryption performed at higher layers
[1]. The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel has
been studied in [2]-[4], for example.
In the burgeoning literature on the MIMO wiretap channel, a
number of transmit precoding techniques have been proposed
to improve the channel secrecy rate by exploiting knowledge
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of either the instantaneous realizations or statistics of the
channel to the eavesdropper [2]-[3]. However, the question of
how the legitimate transmitter acquires a passive eavesdrop-
per’s CSI has yet to be answered satisfactorily. The authors
have previously proposed precoding schemes for the MIMO
wiretap channel when the eavesdropper’s CSI is completely
unknown in [5], [6]. More importantly, it is imperative that
the presence of a passive eavesdropper be determined before
the transmitter can deploy robust secrecy-encoding schemes as
a countermeasure. This is a difficult task in a dynamic wireless
network, since by definition the eavesdropper is passive and
never transmits. To our best knowledge, the problem of
determining the potential presence of passive eavesdroppers
in the wiretap channel has not been addressed previously.
In this work we propose a scheme that allows the le-
gitimate nodes to detect the passive eavesdropper from the
local oscillator power that is inadvertently leaked from its
RF front-end even when in reception mode. This technique
was recently proposed in [7]–[9] for spectrum sensing in
single-antenna cognitive radios (CR) to avoid interfering with
primary receivers under AWGN channels. We generalize this
technique to MIMO channels in a wiretap scenario for a vari-
ety of detectors based on energy detection, matched filtering,
and composite tests. We then investigate how the proposed
detection algorithms allow the legitimate nodes to increase the
MIMO secrecy rate of the channel. The eavesdropper detection
problem is essentially analogous to very low-SNR multi-
antenna spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks. While
the majority of prior work on multi-antenna CR spectrum
sensing aim to detect a single-antenna primary transmitter in
zero-mean white Gaussian noise, in this work we explicitly
consider the detection of a full-rank signal of interest in non-
zero-mean Gaussian noise.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. The
MIMO wiretap channel with a passive eavesdropper is intro-
duced in Sec. II. Coherent and noncoherent methods of detect-
ing Eve’s presence are characterized in Sec. II-C. Composite
tests accounting for unknown noise and leakage parameters are
examined in Sec. IV. The optimization of Eve’s parameters
given knowledge of the tests to detect her presence are
briefly discussed in Sec. V, followed by numerical results and
conclusions in Sec. VI and Sec. VII, respectively.
Notation: We will use CN (c,Z) to denote a circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with mean c and
covariance matrix Z, and N (c,Z) for the real-valued counter-
part. Furthermore, we let E{·} denote expectation, (·)T is the
transpose, (·)H is the Hermitian transpose, ℜ represents the
real part, Tr{·} is the trace operator, rank(·) is the matrix rank,
2diag{a} is a diagonal matrix with a on the main diagonal,
λi(A) is the ith ordered eigenvalue of A in descending
order, 2F1 (·, ·; ·; ·) is the hypergeometric function, and I is
an identity matrix of appropriate dimension.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model
We consider a multi-user network with an Na-antenna
transmitter (Alice), an Nb-antenna receiver (Bob), and an
unauthorized eavesdropper (Eve) with Ne antennas. When
Alice is transmitting to Bob and Eve is listening in the vicinity,
the received signals at Bob and Eve at time instant t are given
by
yb (t) =
√
d−αab Hbax (t) + nb (t) (1)
ye (t) =
√
d−αae Heax (t) + ne (t) , (2)
where x (t) ∈ CNa×1 is the confidential information sig-
nal, Hba ∈ CNb×Na ,Hea ∈ CNe×Na are the determinis-
tic and invariant complex MIMO channels from Alice, the
distances from Alice to Bob and Eve are dab > 0 and
dae > 0, respectively, and α is the path-loss exponent.
The additive complex Gaussian noise vectors are assumed
to be independent, spatially uncorrelated, and distributed as
nb (t) ∼ CN
(
0, σ2bI
)
,ne (t) ∼ CN
(
0, σ2eI
)
. An average
power constraint is imposed on Alice’s transmit covariance
matrix Q = E
{
x (t)x (t)
H
}
in the form of Tr (Q) ≤ Pa.
Irrespective of the potential presence of Eve, both Alice and
Bob are assumed to have perfect knowledge of the main
channelHba, which can be attained by the use of conventional
training methods. If the input signal x is drawn from a
Gaussian distribution, the instantaneous MIMO secrecy rate
[3] for fixed channels when Eve is present is given by
Rs,i = log2
∣∣∣I+ d−αab σ−2b HbaQHHba∣∣∣
− log2
∣∣∣I+ d−αae σ−2e HeaQHHea∣∣∣ . (3)
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Fig. 1. MIMO wiretap channel with RF front end of Eve highlighted.
The wiretap channel is depicted in Fig. 1. The fundamental
procedure of detecting the passive node Eve is as follows.
We assume all three nodes possess either heterodyne or
direct-conversion transceivers. A general impairment in such
receivers is that a small portion of the local oscillator (LO)
signal back-propagates to the antenna ports and leaks out, even
when in passive reception mode [10]. While the LO leakage
signal power is on the order of -50 to -90 dBm from a single
antenna port, the LO leakage signal is boosted when multiple
RF chains are present as in the MIMO wiretap setting, and is
consequently easier to detect.
Therefore, we assume that Alice periodically ceases data
transmission in order to allow both herself and Bob to indepen-
dently sense the radio environment, followed by a joint fusion
of their individual decisions. Since the sensing algorithm and
process is assumed to be identical at both Alice and Bob, to
avoid repetition we focus on the local detection process at Bob
in the sequel. The binary hypothesis test at Bob during these
‘silent’ periods is
H0 :yb (t) =
√
d−αab Hbawl (t) + nb (t) (4)
H1 :yb (t) =
√
d−αbe Hbesl (t) +
√
d−αab Hbawl (t) + nb (t)
where Hbe ∈ CNb×Na is the complex MIMO leakage channel
from Eve to Bob who are separated by distance dbe. The LO
leakage signals from Alice and Eve are represented by wl (t)
and sl (t), respectively. Eq. (4) can also be used to model a
distributed network of single-antenna sensors that report their
observations over orthogonal channels to a fusion center in
order to detect the presence of Eve.
The aggregate LO leakage signal from Eve is
sl (t) =
[
s1 (t) . . . sNe (t)
]T
. (5)
We model the LO leakage signal from Eve’s ith antenna port
as an unmodulated frequency tone [9]:
si (t) = Ai cos (ωt+ θi(t)) , (6)
where Ai is the amplitude, ω is the LO frequency, and θi is an
arbitrary time-varying phase. Similarly, the LO leakage signal
from Alice is wl (t) =
[
w1 (t) . . . wNa (t)
]T
, where
wi (t) = Bi cos (ω˜t+ ξi(t)) , (7)
where Bi is the amplitude, ω˜ is Alice’s LO frequency, and ξi
is an arbitrary phase coefficient.
B. Secrecy Rate Performance
We consider the following signal transmission model. The
overall data transmission period is split into blocks of T
channel uses. At the beginning of each block, Alice and Bob
independently sense the radio environment for the presence
of Eve. If the consensus is that Eve is absent, then for the
remaining T − 1 channel uses in that block Alice designs her
input covariance Q to maximize the conventional MIMO rate
to Bob via waterfilling [11]. If Eve is determined to be present,
Alice acquires the statistics of her channel Hea and optimizes
Q by splitting her transmit resources between data and an
artificial jamming signal such that the expected value of the
MIMO secrecy rate for that block is maximized [2]. The block
duration T is assumed to be long enough in order to invoke
information-theoretic random coding arguments.
Define Pdc and Pfc as the overall consensus detection and
false alarm probabilities derived via an arbitrary fusion rule
3from the local decisions at Alice and Bob. For the commonly
used AND and OR decision fusion rules, Pdc can be defined
as
Pdc =
{
P 1DP
2
D AND rule
1−
∏2
i=1
(
1− P iD
)
OR rule (8)
where P iD, i = 1, 2, are the local detection probabilities at
Alice and Bob that are derived in subsequent sections. If Eve
is modeled as being present in a particular transmission block
with a prior probability β that is unknown to Alice/Bob, the
expected value of the MIMO secrecy rate for an arbitrary block
is written as
R¯s = RbPdc (1− β) +RsPdcβ + (Rb −Re) (1− Pdc)β
+ R˜bPfc (1− β) , (9)
where Rs is the ergodic MIMO secrecy rate, Re is the
information rate leaked to Eve upon missed detection, and
R˜b is the sub-optimal rate to Bob when some resources are
mistakenly allocated for secrecy encoding by Alice.
C. Eavesdropper Detection
The authors in [7] mainly focus on the use of a coherent
matched filter detector [12] for determining the presence of the
primary receiver at a single-antenna cognitive radio. However,
the matched filter approach requires phase synchronization
at Bob as well as estimation of Hbe, which is exceedingly
difficult given the very low LO leakage power. Park et
al. propose noncoherent envelope detection in the frequency
domain by applying a discrete Fourier transform (DFT) to
the down-converted and sampled received signal [8], [9], also
in a single-antenna setting. In this work we focus on multi-
antenna detection in the time domain, and assume that Eve’s
LO frequency ω˜ (or a good estimate of it) is known a priori to
both legitimate terminals during downconversion to baseband.
If Eve employs a direct-conversion receiver, then as a worst-
case scenario her LO frequency can be assumed to be known
exactly since it is optimal for her to set ω˜ = ω. The same is
true if all terminals have an identical heterodyne architecture.
After downconverting and sampling, the hypothesis test at
Bob based on M discrete-time vector observations is
H0 : yb [n] =mA [n] + nb [n] ,
H1 : yb [n] =mE [n] +mA [n] + nb [n] ,
(10)
for n = 0, . . . ,M − 1, where
mA [n] =
√
d−αab Hbawd [n]
mE [n] =
√
d−αbe Hbesd [n]
wd [n] =
[
B1e
(jω˜n+ξ1[n]) . . . BNae
(jω˜n+ξNa [n])
]T
sd [n] =
[
A1e
(jωn+θ1[n]) . . . ANee
(jωn+θNa [n])
]T
.
The deterministic MIMO channels Hba and Hbe are assumed
to be constant during the detection process. It is assumed that
Bob’s own leakage signal is removed and does not contaminate
the detection process [9]. The received signal has the following
multivariate normal distributions:
yb [n] ∼ CN
(
mA [n] , σ
2
bI
)
under H0
yb [n] ∼ CN
(
mE [n] +mA [n] , σ
2
b I
)
under H1
(11)
For convenience we aggregate the samples into a (Nb×M )
observation matrix
Yb =
[
yb [0] . . . yb [M − 1]
] (12)
which follows a matrix-variate normal distribution [14] under
both hypotheses:
Yb ∼ CN
(
MA, σ
2
bI
)
under H0
Yb ∼ CN
(
ME +MA, σ
2
bI
)
under H1
(13)
where we define
MA = [mA [0], . . . ,mA [M − 1]] (14)
ME = [mE [0], . . . ,mE [M − 1]] . (15)
III. NONCOHERENT AND COHERENT DETECTION
A. Energy Detection
Energy detection (ED) is a low-complexity noncoherent
technique that obviates the need to estimate the leakage
signal parameters and channels, and only requires an accurate
estimate of the background noise variance σ2b [12]. The ED
test statistic is given by
TED (Yb) = Tr
(
YHb Yb
)
=
M−1∑
n=0
‖yb [n]‖
2
. (16)
The ED hypothesis test compares the test statistic to a thresh-
old η to determine the presence of Eve:
TED (Yb)
H1
≷
H0
η , (17)
where η is determined by a pre-specified probability of false
alarm constraint PFA.
From (11), under both hypotheses TED (Yb) has a noncen-
tral chi-square distribution, since it is the sum of the squares of
2MNb real and independent nonzero-mean Gaussian random
variables:
H0 : TED (Yb) ∼
σ2
b
2 χ
′2
2MNb
(λ0)
H1 : TED (Yb) ∼
σ2
b
2 χ
′2
2MNb
(λ1)
(18)
with associated noncentrality parameters
λ0 =
(
2
/
σ2b
)
Tr
(
ℜ
{
MTAMA
})
λ1 =
(
2
/
σ2b
)
Tr
(
ℜ
{
(ME +MA)
T
(ME +MA)
})
,
respectively. Under the null hypothesis, TED (Yb) has the
density function
fT (t;H0) =
e
−
(
λ0+2t/σ2b
2
)
σ2b
(
2t
σ2bλ0
)MNb−1
2
IMNb−1
(√
2tλ0
σ2b
)
and the probability of false alarm is calculated as
PFA = QMNb
(√
λ0,
√
2η
σ2b
)
, (19)
where Qk (a, b) = a1−k
∫∞
b t
ke−
t2+a2
2 Ik−1 (at)dt is the
generalized Marcum Q-function, and Ik is the modified Bessel
4function of the first kind of order k [12], [15]. Similarly, the
probability of detection is
PD = QMNb
(√
λ1,
√
2η
σ2b
)
. (20)
The value of the threshold η that corresponds to a particular
PFA can be computed by empirically evaluating the Marcum
Q-function, or from the approximate inversion of the Marcum
Q-function [15].
B. Optimal Detector
As an alternative to energy detection, we now consider the
optimal Neyman-Pearson detector when all parameters of the
leakage signals are assumed to be known to Bob. While un-
realizable in practice, the optimal coherent detector provides
an upper bound on the detection performance of any possible
test. From (11)-(13), the likelihood function under the null
hypothesis is
f (Yb;H0) =
M−1∏
n=0
f (yb [n] ;H0)
=
M−1∏
n=0
1
(πσ2b )
Nb
exp
[
−
(yb [n]−mA [n])
H
(yb [n]−mA [n])
σ2b
]
=
1
(πσ2b )
MNb
exp

−Tr
{
(Yb −MA)
H (Yb −MA)
}
σ2b


with the corresponding log-likelihood function
L0 (Yb) = −MNb ln
(
πσ2b
)
−
1
σ2b
Tr
{
(Yb −MA)
H (Yb −MA)
}
.
(21)
Define M1 ,ME +MA. Under the alternative hypothesis
H1, a similar analysis yields
f (Yb;H1) =
1
(πσ2b )
MNb
× exp

−Tr
{
(Yb −M1)
H
(Yb −M1)
}
σ2b

 ,
L1 (Yb) = −MNb ln
(
πσ2b
)
−
1
σ2b
Tr
{
(Yb −M1)
H
(Yb −M1)
}
.(22)
The optimal Neyman-Pearson test compares the log-
likelihood ratio to a threshold that corresponds to a particular
PFA:
L1 (Yb)− L0 (Yb)
H1
≷
H0
ε′. (23)
Simple manipulations lead to the following test statistic:
Top (Yb) = Tr
{
ℜ
(
MHEYb
)}H1
≷
H0
ε, (24)
where ε = 12σ
2
b ε
′ + 0.5Tr
{
MHE (ME +MA) +M
H
AME
}
.
Therefore, the optimal detection rule is observed to be a
replica-correlator or equivalently a matched filter, which is the
expected outcome for detecting a known complex determinis-
tic signal in Gaussian noise [12].
Next, we note that the test statistic is distributed as
H0 : Top (Yb) ∼ N
(
ℜ
(
Tr
{
MHEMA
})
,
σ2
b
2 Tr
{
MHEME
})
H1 : Top (Yb) ∼ N
(
ℜ
(
Tr
{
MHEM1
})
,
σ2
b
2 Tr
{
MHEME
})
from which we can derive the probabilities of detection and
false alarm as
PFA = Q

ε−ℜ (Tr{MHEMA})√
σ2
b
2 Tr
{
MHEME
}

 (25)
PD = Q

ε−ℜ (Tr{MHEM1})√
σ2
b
2 Tr
{
MHEME
}

 . (26)
It is evident that the threshold value ε that corresponds to a
target false-alarm probability can be computed from (25) as
ε =
√
σ2
b
2 Tr
{
MHEME
}
Q−1(PFA) + ℜ
(
Tr
{
MHEMA
})
.
IV. DETECTION UNDER UNKNOWN PARAMETERS
Thus far we have studied the energy detector, which does
not require any information of the leakage parameters, and the
optimal replica-correlator which assumes all parameters are
known. To do better than ED, we can treat the leakage signal
and channel parameters of Eve as unknown deterministic
parameters to be estimated at Bob, and pose generalized
likelihood ratio tests (GLRT) for these cases. The GLRT
is a constant false-alarm rate detector which has featured
prominently in the spectrum sensing literature [16]-[23], with
various assumptions about the signal model. [16]-[19] consider
the detection of rank-1 signals, [21] considers a test statistic
based on the DFT of the received signal, and no performance
analysis of the GLRT is given in [20], [22]. Alternatives to
GLRTs with unknown parameters are the blind test in [24]
based on non-parametric empirical characteristic functions,
and a heuristic test statistic based on the cross-correlation
among signals at all antenna pairs [25]. However, the test in
[24] cannot be characterized analytically, and [25] assumes a
particular channel autocorrelation model such as Clarke’s or
Jake’s, which is not applicable when the signal of interest is
a very low power sinewave as in our case. In the sequel, we
continue to assume that the leakage channel Hba and related
signal parameters from Alice are completely known at Bob
[11], and possibly to Eve as well.
A. Unknown noise variance
We begin with the case where both the effective leakage
channels are changing slowly enough to have been determined
in previous epochs, but the background noise variance in the
current test epoch σ2b is unknown, possibly due to time-varying
interference. Following the standard derivation of the GLRT
[12], we first compute the maximum likelihood estimates
5(MLEs) of σ2b under the two competing hypotheses from the
derivatives of (21)-(22):
σˆ2b|H0 =
Tr
{
(Yb −MA)
H
(Yb −MA)
}
MNb
(27)
σˆ2b|H1 =
Tr
{
(Yb −M1)
H (Yb −M1)
}
MNb
. (28)
These MLEs are also applicable to the energy detector in III-A
for the case where the noise power is unknown a priori, since
the ED test threshold is a function of σ2b .
The log-GLRT is then obtained by substituting (27)–(28)
into (21)–(22):
TG1 (Yb) = L1
(
Yb; σˆ
2
b|H1
)
− L0
(
Yb; σˆ
2
b|H0
)H1
≷
H0
η1 (29)
=
Tr
{
(Yb −MA)
H
(Yb −MA)
}
Tr
{
(Yb −M1)
H
(Yb −M1)
} H1≷
H0
eη1/MNb .
(30)
Determining the appropriate threshold η , eη1/MNb to meet
a target PFA requires the pdf of the GLRT test statistic under
the null hypothesis H0. Let
X , Yb −MA (31)
W , XXH ; W1 , (X−ME) (X−ME)
H (32)
based on which we can rewrite
TG1 (Yb) =
Tr {W}
Tr {W1}
.
Under the null hypothesis, we haveX ∼ CN
(
0, σ2b I
)
and thus
W is a central Wishart matrix. Clearly, the matrix (X−ME)
is distributed as (X−ME) ∼ CN
(
−ME, σ
2
b I
)
under H0,
thus W1 in the denominator of TG1 (Yb) has a noncentral
Wishart distribution.
Therefore, under hypothesis H0 TG1 is the ratio of two
dependent random variables: the trace of the central Wishart
matrix W and trace of the noncentral Wishart matrix W1.
Since this does not correspond to a known distribution and
no straightforward method1 exists to derive the exact pdf, we
approximate the distribution of TG1 as follows. For tractability,
we first approximate W1 with a spatially-correlated central
Wishart matrix CCH , where C = Ψ1/2X, which has ap-
proximately the same first- and second-order moments as W1
[26], [27]. This yields Ψ = I+M−1MEMHE as the effective
correlation matrix. Since the detection of a weak LO leakage
signal requires that the number of samples M be many orders
of magnitude larger than Nb, it is sufficient to consider the
case of rank(Yb) = rank(X) = Nb. Furthermore,
Tr {W1} ≃ Tr
{
ΨXXH
}
≤
∑Nb
i=1
λi (Ψ)λi (W) (33)
where the eigenvalue inequality is due to [30, Thm. 2]. Defin-
ing the ordered eigenvalues γi = λi (W) and ψi = λi (Ψ), we
1The trace of a non-central Wishart matrix has a distribution characterized
by zonal polynomials or infinite series.
have
Pr {TG1 (Yb) ≥ η} ≈ Pr
{ ∑Nb
i=1 γi∑Nb
i=1 ψiγi
≥ η
}
(34)
≤ Pr
{
Nbγ1∑Nb
i=1 ψiγi
≥ η
}
(35)
≤ Pr
{
Nbγ1
ψNb
∑Nb
i=1 γi
≥ η
}
(36)
where (34) follows from (33). Let T0 , Nbγ1
/∑
i γi repre-
sent the scaled largest eigenvalue of W divided by its trace.
A number of different results are available in the literature
for exact and approximate probability distributions of T0. We
adopt the approximate CDF in [28, eq. 27] due to its accuracy
and relatively simple closed-form expression, which has the
form
FT0 (y) = c (B (y)−B (1)) , y ∈ [1,∞] (37)
where c = Γ(m/2)(Nb̟)
−k
kΓ(m/2−k)Γ(k) , m = 2MNb, k and
̟ are constants that are functions of the matrix di-
mensions M and Nb [28, eqs. 12,13], and B (x) =
2F1
(
k, 1 + k − 0.5m; k + 1; xNb̟
)
xk. The desired upper
bound on PFA in (36) then simplifies to
Pr
{
Nbγ1
ψNb
∑Nb
i=1 γi
≥ η
}
= 1− FT0 (ψNbη) . (38)
To compute the probability of detection for the GLRT with
unknown noise variance, we must determine the distribution
of T0 under the alternative hypothesis H1. Returning to (30),
we now define
X , Yb −M1,
such that
TG1 (Yb) =
Tr {W1}
Tr {W}
.
Next, we observe X ∼ CN
(
0, σ2bI
)
, which implies that W =
XXH in the denominator of TG1 (Yb) is a central Wishart ma-
trix. Now, the matrix X+ME is distributed as (X+ME) ∼
CN
(
ME, σ
2
b I
)
, such that W1 = (X+ME) (X+ME)H
in the numerator of TG1 (Yb) is a non-central Wishart ma-
trix. Therefore, under hypothesis H1, TG1 is the ratio of
two dependent random variables: the trace of the noncentral
Wishart matrix W1 and trace of the central Wishart matrix
W. Similar to (33) we set Tr {W} ≃ Tr{ΨXXH}, where
Ψ = I + M−1MEM
H
E is the effective correlation matrix.
We can then repeat the preceding steps involved in the
computation of PFA with minor modifications, to obtain the
following lower bound on the detection probability:
Pr {TG1 (Yb) ≥ η | H1} ≥ FT0
(
ςNb
η
)
, (39)
where ςNb is the smallest eigenvalue of Ψ, and FT0 (·) is
defined in (37).
6B. Unknown noise variance and leakage channel of Eve
We now consider the most general case where the unknown
parameters are the noise variance and Eve’s leakage ampli-
tude and phase, i.e.,
(
σ2b ,Hbe, {Ai}
Ne
i=1, {θi[n]}i,n
)
. Recall
that Alice and Bob are cooperative nodes and can exchange
estimates of Alice’s leakage parameters, which we continue to
assume are known at Bob. Since frequency ω is known, we
can rewrite (15) as ME = M′ED, where M′E is unknown
and D = diag
{
1, ejω, . . . , ejω(M−1)
}
is a known full-rank
matrix. Direct differentiation of (30) yields the MLE (cf. [31])
Mˆ′E = (Yb −MA)D
H . (40)
The log-GLRT is then given by TG2 (Yb)
H1
≷
H0
eη2/MNb ,
where
TG2 (Yb) =
Tr
{
(Yb −MA)
H
(Yb −MA)
}
Tr
{(
Yb − Mˆ′ED−MA
)H (
Yb − Mˆ′ED−MA
)} .
(41)
Substituting (40) into (41), we have
TG2 (Yb) =
Tr
{
(Yb −MA)
H (Yb −MA)
}
Tr
{
MA
HMA
} . (42)
Therefore, we can utilize existing expressions for the distribu-
tion of the trace of a central and non-central Wishart matrix to
compute the exact PFA and PD of the above test, respectively.
The trace of a central Wishart matrix follows a (scaled) chi-
squared distribution, thus
PFA = 1− P
(
MNb, σ
−2
b Tr
{
MHAMA
}
eη2/MNb
)
(43)
where P (·, ·) is the regularized Gamma function. Under H1,
(42) is the scaled trace of a non-central Wishart matrix
(equivalent to a weighted sum of independent non-central chi-
squared variables), the exact distribution of which is given in
[32]. Thus,
PD = 1−
∞∑
k=0
ckP
(
MNb + k,
1
2λσ2b
Tr
{
MHAMA
}
eη2/MNb
)
(44)
where coefficients ck are computed recursively based on [32,
eqs. 2.6,2.9], and 0 < λ < ∞ is arbitrary. A simpler
expression can be obtained if desired by approximating the
above trace with a single non-central chi-squared variate of
the same first moment [33].
V. EAVESDROPPING STRATEGIES
We have thus far proposed and characterized various statisti-
cal tests to determine the presence of a passive MIMO eaves-
dropper. In the event that the eavesdropper is a malevolent
adversary, she may take evasive measures to avoid detection
while at the same time attempting to intercept as much
information as possible. This implies that Eve is omniscient
in the sense that she is able to estimate the relative locations
of Alice/Bob and the leakage detection scheme in place. The
key parameters under Eve’s control are her location relative to
Alice/Bob and the number of antennas Ne: decreasing dae or
increasing Ne enhances both her interception rate as well as
the likelihood of being detected.
First consider the impact of Eve’s distance from Alice and
Bob for a given Ne. Let us define the instantaneous leakage
rate from Alice to Eve as
Re = log2
∣∣∣I+HeaQHHeaZ−1e ∣∣∣ , (45)
which is the second term of the MIMO secrecy rate expression
in (3). It is assumed that Eve is interested in maintaining a
threshold R¯e for the instantaneous or average leakage rate.
For Rayleigh fading channels, a Gaussian approximation for
the MIMO mutual information in the large-antenna regime [34,
Thm. 3] results in the following average leakage rate:
EHea {Re} ≃ d
−α
ae Ne
Pa
Na
log2e.
As an example, the eavesdropper can seek to minimize the
probability of being detected, subject to a minimum average
leakage rate constraint:
(P1) : min
dae,dbe
Pdc
s.t. E{Re} ≥ R¯e
(46)
This problem has a straightforward solution. An average
leakage rate constraint of R¯e requires
dae ≤
(
R¯eNaPa
Nelog2e
)−1/α
.
Since the leakage rate constraint is independent of dbe, and
since Pdc is decreasing with respect to dae, the optimal value
of dae is attained when the leakage rate constraint is met with
equality. The optimal value of dbe is then the furthest possible
distance from Bob for this optimal d∗ae. Geometrically, Eve’s
optimal location is the point of intersection of the circle of
radius d∗ae centered at Alice and the line joining Alice and
Bob.
The LO leakage phenomenon essentially precludes the use
of fast antenna switching at Eve, therefore she must decide
on how many antennas are to be deployed at the initiation
of the eavesdropping attack. A rough assessment of her risk-
reward tradeoff can be obtained by simply enumerating R¯s
for the various possible values of Ne. Further insight can be
obtained by analyzing the behavior of Pdc, Re, and R¯s as Ne
varies: does the rate at which Pdc increases outweigh the rate
of gain in Re or vice versa? This exercise is carried out via
simulations in Sec. VI.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We present simulation results obtained by averaging over
1000 i.i.d. Rayleigh channel fading instances for several net-
work scenarios. In each instance the eavesdropper is present
with probability β = 0.5. Unless stated otherwise, we set the
number of antennas as Na = Nb = Ne = 4, the distance
between Alice and Bob is assumed to be dab = 10m, and
dae = dbe. The leakage amplitude is set to -50 dBm/antenna
with an IF frequency of 200 kHZ and unit noise power for all
users, and the number of samples is fixed at M = 105.
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Fig. 2. ROC performance of various eavesdropper detectors.
The empirical and theoretical receiver operating charac-
teristic (ROC) curves of the detection schemes described in
Sec. III and Sec. IV are displayed in Fig. 2. GLRT 1 and
GLRT 2 denote the composite tests described in Sec. IV-A
and Sec. IV-B, respectively. The detection probabilities shown
here are the local metrics at Bob, and the theoretical results
are generally in good agreement with simulations. The energy
detector fails to distinguish between the null and alternative
hypotheses and is virtually unusable, even under the assump-
tion of a perfectly known noise variance σ2b . The GLRTs are
both more robust and perform much closer to optimal MF
detection as compared to ED. The joint detection probability
Pdc in (8) will by definition exhibit similar trends.
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Fig. 3. Ergodic secrecy rate versus transmit power Pa.
Fig. 3 depicts R¯s versus Alice’s total power constraint Pa
for ED and GLRT 2 detectors, as well as a non-adaptive
scheme which pessimistically assumes that Eve is always
present and always has Alice allocate a fraction of power for
artificial noise [2]. Eve is located 10m away from both legiti-
mate terminals. The local eavesdropper detection decisions at
Alice and Bob are combined using an OR fusion rule. It is ev-
ident that the eavesdropper detection schemes outperform the
non-adaptive strategy by reducing the unnecessary allocation
of resources for secure transmission when the eavesdropper is
absent.
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Fig. 4. Rates and joint detection probability as a function of distance dae.
In Fig. 4, the eavesdropper is moved along a line parallel
to the line between Alice and Bob, with dab = 9m being
fixed. It is assumed Eve has a desired leakage rate target of
R¯e = 3, which translates into an optimal distance of roughly
dae = 4.5m according to (46). This predicted distance is
quite close to the observed value of dae corresponding to
the empirical rate R¯e = 3. Furthermore, the joint detection
probability using MF is at its lowest value around this spatial
location, which is intuitive since increasing dae brings Eve
closer to Bob, thus R¯s is seen to increase with dae due to the
combined factors of improved Pdc and diminishing leakage
Re. From the perspective of the legitimate nodes, increasing
the number of observation samples M to further improve Pdc
detracts from the time available for data transmission, while
increasing Na or Nb will improve the interception capability
of Eve. On the other hand the interception capability of Eve
is degraded as dae grows; the interplay of these factors has
interesting implications for the eavesdropper when she can
choose where to position herself.
Fig. 5 highlights the joint detection probability based on
MF, along with leakage rate Re and average secrecy rate R¯s,
as Ne varies for fixed Na = Nb = 2. In a conventional
MIMO system the received mutual information is always non-
decreasing in the number of receiver antennas, and this is
borne out by the behavior of Re. On the other hand, in our
wiretap setting an increase in Ne also boosts the ability of the
legitimate nodes to detect the eavesdropper, as exemplified by
Pdc. As a result, the average secrecy rate actually increases
as Ne grows from two to five, while ultimately approaching
zero in the regime where Eve has four times as many antennas
as Alice and Bob. Thus, an interesting tradeoff exists for Eve
when choosing how many antennas to activate for wiretapping.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In the MIMO wiretap channel, it is critical that the presence
of a passive eavesdropper be determined so as to enable robust
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Fig. 5. Joint detection probability and leakage/secrecy rates versus number
of eavesdropper antennas.
secrecy-encoding schemes as a countermeasure. In this work
we studied the performance of methods in which the legitimate
nodes attempt to detect the eavesdropper from the local
oscillator power that is inadvertently leaked from its RF front
end. We analyzed the performance of non-coherent energy
detection as well as optimal coherent detection to obtain
lower and upper limits on the achievable detection probability.
Subsequently, two robust detectors based on GLRTs were
derived to account for cases with unknown leakage and noise
parameters. We then showed how the proposed detectors allow
the legitimate nodes to increase the MIMO secrecy rate of the
channel. Issues of interest for further study include the design
of sequential detectors for optimizing the sensing duration
used to detect potential eavesdroppers.
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